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INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment guarantees the right of free speech, both
written and spoken, to all Americans. Such protection is not
limited to words that can be directly tied to the speaker;
anonymous speech is protected as well.1 Since the Founding Era,
anonymous speech has played a significant role in American
history, influencing both court rulings and free speech traditions.2
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that anonymous
speech has value and is protected by the First Amendment. 3
Regardless of the value inherent in anonymous speech, however, it
is not afforded unlimited First Amendment protection.
Anonymous speech is prevalent in all of cyberspace. From
anonymous product reviews to message boards, the Internet
provides the medium for the instantaneous flow of speech, which
is often hateful and destructive. This speech is couched in
anonymity to protect the speaker from retribution and often would
not be said in a face-to-face confrontation for fear of a violent
response. Although the Supreme Court has ruled that First
Amendment protections apply in cyberspace, the Court has not yet
defined the extent to which anonymous online speech can be
protected or regulated.4
The First Amendment does not protect all speech equally;
rather, certain categories of speech are disfavored and do not
1

See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150 (2002); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
2
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison published the Federalist Papers
anonymously. All papers were published under the name “Publius.” The Anti-Federalist
Papers were also published anonymously. These were written under pseudonyms
including “Cato,” “Brutus,” “Centinel,” and “Federal Farmer.”
3
See, e.g., Watchtower, 536 U.S. 150; McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334; Talley, 362 U.S. 60.
4
See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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receive the presumptive protection that such categories as political
speech do. 5 Two categories of disfavored speech are speech
inciting violence and fighting words. 6 The Supreme Court has
held that states can constitutionally proscribe speech that is
directed to incite imminent lawless action and that will likely incite
or produce such action.7 Fighting words, on the other hand, are
classified as speech in which the violence is directed against the
speaker. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court
defined fighting words as “those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”8
A crucial factor for the Supreme Court in determining whether
or not speech falls into one of these categories is the imminence
and likelihood of violent action.9 In the Founding Era, the press
was not immediate, but hot news needed to be printed and
subsequently distributed. Therefore, it was unlikely that written
speech in the press would cause imminent lawless action. Today,
however, cyberspace is intimately intertwined with everyday life.
With cell phones and Wi-Fi hotspots, the Internet is constantly at
individuals’ fingertips and messages are transmitted
instantenously. Regulations of speech in cyberspace should
therefore be examined in terms of speech freedom rather than press
freedom.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the history
of the First Amendment’s protections for anonymous speech and
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding state regulation of
speech. Part II discusses the recent prevalence of Internet
cyberbullying and the First Amendment challenges posed by any
attempts to regulate anonymous speech online. Part II also
5

See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 1017 (4th ed. 2011).
6
See id.
7
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see also NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists,
290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002).
8
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding
that the words “Fuck the Draft” did not rise to the level of fighting words because there
was no showing of actual violence intended or aroused).
9
See, e.g., Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886; Cohen, 403 U.S. 15; Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444.

826

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 24:823

explores the arguments for and against regulating anonymous
online speech, as well as the extent to which that speech may be
constitutionally proscribed. Part III argues that cyberbullying is
analogous to fighting words because the intimacy of social media
makes cyberspeech more like a verbal assault than a printed
communication. As such, states should be able to regulate
anonymous cyberspeech in the same manner and to the same
extent that they may regulate the spoken word.
I. LEGAL EVOLUTION OF FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that “Congress shall make no law [ . . . ] abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press.”10 Traditionally, the right to
free speech has been considered of the utmost importance to
Americans. Despite the profound importance of free speech,
however, it is widely recognized and accepted that the First
Amendment has limits and does not universally protect any and all
speech. This Part discusses the evolution of First Amendment
jurisprudence for all speech. Part I.A explores the history of
anonymous speech regulation. Part I.B discusses the way the
Court has dealt with state regulation of speech with an identifiable
author. Part I.C explores the detrimental effects cyberbullying has
on children and teenagers, providing specific examples of the harm
caused by unrestricted cyberspeech.
A. History of Anonymous Speech Regulation
The First Amendment has protected anonymous speech since
the Founding Era. Historically, freedom of speech has been
justified for three main reasons: advancing knowledge and truth in
the marketplace of ideas; facilitating representative democracy and
self-government; and promoting individual autonomy, selfexpression and self-fulfillment. 11 Anonymous speech has been
held to have inherent value and is thus protected by the First

10
11

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 954–58.
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Amendment.12 From an originalist perspective, the mere fact that
anonymous speech was allowed and protected during the Founding
Era is enough to justify the protection of anonymous speech today.
However, there are prudential concerns to this argument, as the
goal was arguably not to protect vicious anonymous hate speech
and harassment.
Since the Founding Era, anonymous speech has been used to
further public discourse. Three influential thinkers and Framers of
the Constitution availed themselves of the right to publish
anonymous speech in producing the Federalist Papers. 13
Consisting of eighty-five different essays that encourage the
adoption of and deliberation about the new Constitution, the
Federalist Papers were written by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay,
and James Madison, and were published under the pseudonym
Publius. 14 Anti-Federalists in the Founding Era also published
pseudonymous works, using such names as Cato, Brutus, Centinel,
and Founding Farmer.15
Throughout history, the Supreme Court has reiterated that the
First Amendment also protects anonymous speech. In 1960, the
Court struck down a California ban on anonymous handbills. 16
Justice Black, in declaring the statute unconstitutional, explicitly
stated that “[a]nonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even
books have played an important role in the progress of mankind.”17
Furthermore, Justice Black went on to hold that identification
requirements restrict both freedom to distribute information and
freedom of expression and, further, that anonymity is often used
for constructive purposes. 18 In 1995, the Supreme Court again
held that the First Amendment protects anonymous speech in

12

See id. at 1002.
See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 1–85 (Alexander Hamilton, John Jay & James
Madison) (Goldwin Smith ed., 1901).
14
See generally id.
15
See generally THE ANTI-FEDERALIST: WRITINGS BY THE OPPONENTS OF THE
CONSTITUTION (Herbert J. Storing ed., abridged, 1985).
16
See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
17
Id. at 64.
18
Id. at 64–65.
13
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McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission.19 In McIntyre, the Court
struck down a law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous
campaign literature, noting that political expression would be
burdened if the law were to be maintained. The McIntyre Court
further held that the regulation at issue was subject to strict
scrutiny because of its content-based nature.20 Anonymous speech,
therefore, has inherent value and is thus accorded high First
Amendment protections, and regulation of such speech must be
reviewed under strict scrutiny.
Anonymity allows an individual to be judged solely by the
content of his or her speech rather than any personal opinion
people may have of the author.
Anonymity encourages
participation in the political process without fear of retribution.21
Margot Kaminski, Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School, points to
recent anti-mask laws to claim that the Supreme Court has upheld
anonymous speech protections beyond political speech to protect
all forms of free expression. 22 Addressing free expression
protection, Kaminski also notes that “pure anonymity . . . will
become increasingly expressive,” pointing to the Internet as a
medium for spreading anonymous speech.23
The Supreme Court has upheld certain regulations pertaining to
anonymous speech that require identity disclosure. Specifically in
the area of campaign finance, the Court has found that such
disclosure requirements do not violate First Amendment rights. In
Buckley v. Valeo, the Court upheld the portion of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 requiring disclosure of the
identities of campaign donors to every political candidate and
committee. 24 Finding that the government had a significant
interest in maintaining the integrity of the political process,
19

514 U.S. 334 (1995).
See id. at 370; see also Sophia Qasir, Note, Anonymity in Cyberspace: Judicial &
Legislative Regulations, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3651, 3664 (2013).
21
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 1002.
22
See generally Margot Kiminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies: Applying
Anti-Mask Case Law to Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 815 (2013).
23
Id. at 896.
24
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
20
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deterring corruption, and enforcing expenditure limits, the Court
held that the government’s interests outweighed individual speech
rights through use of a balancing test. 25 However, this ruling,
which indicated the moment when governmental interests
outweigh free speech rights, was limited to the context of
campaign finance.
Regulation of anonymous speech on the Internet has not yet
been conclusively established by the Supreme Court and poses an
interesting question for legal scholars. Indeed, numerous scholars
continue to speculate on the limits of online protections of
speech. 26 Couched in anonymity, individuals have taken to
cyberspace to engage in libel and defamation, among other speech
torts. Although the Supreme Court has not yet defined the scope
of disclosure requirements and speech protection, the Ninth Circuit
has addressed this issue. Specifically, in In re Anonymous Online
Speakers, the Ninth Circuit was faced with the question of whether
or not a plaintiff could subpoena the identity of an anonymous
online user accused of interfering with the plaintiff’s business.27
Ultimately, although the court recognized that online speech was
entitled to the same protection as other speech, the subpoena was
granted because the speech in question was not political and thus
entitled to lower First Amendment protections.28 The judiciary has
not yet created a specific rule for establishing how to regulate
anonymous speech in regards to disclosure requirements nor
identified the scrutiny under which those regulations are to be
reviewed.
B. State Regulation of Speech with an Identifiable Author
Government censorship of speech and the press stems from the
Statutes De Scandalis Magnatum, enacted in 1275, which imposed
penalties for any distribution of anything false or critical of the

25
26
27
28

Id. at 66–69.
See discussion infra Part II.
661 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1173.
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King of England. 29 Censorship of speech continued throughout
England and in the American colonies. Colonial governments
often suppressed speech as strongly as the English Parliament did,
and much of the English common law was incorporated into the
common law of the colonies.30 However, freedom of speech soon
came to be considered a fundamental right.
Sir William
Blackstone authoritatively described the right of free speech as a
fundamental right that may still be in some ways regulated by
government:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the
nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no
previous restraints upon publications, and not in
freedom from censure for criminal matter when
published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to
lay what sentiments he pleases before the public;
but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous,
or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own
temerity.31
During the Founding Era, even influential thinkers such as
John Locke urged that “no opinions contrary to human society, or
to those moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of
civil society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate.”32 This caused
problems during the ratification debates, as there was a split
between proponents of the English common law and those, like
James Madison, who endeavored to break from tradition and give
speech more protection from government censorship. 33 For
example, Madison urged a broad constitutional amendment that
would prevent any deprivation or abridgment of “the right to
speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of
the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be
29
See Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the
Control of the Press, 37 STAN. L. REV. 661, 668 (1985).
30
See 2 DAVID M. O’BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: CIVIL RIGHTS AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES 409 (7th ed. 2008).
31
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151–52.
32
See JOHN LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE
at 45–46 (Oxford Univ. Press 11th ed. 1934).
33
See 2 O’BRIEN, supra note 30, at 410.
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inviolable.” 34 Madison stressed that liberty of the press was of
utmost importance to the public and was the “bulwark of liberty.”35
Madison’s view of freedom of speech and the press, however,
was not representative of the majority views of the Founding Era.
The colonies’ experience with censorship from England resulted in
the widespread belief that a guarantee of freedom of speech and
press was necessary but could be regulated by common law
restrictions such as those on libel and slander.36 The newly formed
United States of America ultimately adopted the First Amendment
of the Bill of Rights, which prevents Congress—and, through the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the States as well—from
making any laws abridging freedom of speech and the press.37 The
First Amendment has had a tumultuous history as states have
sought to regulate certain types of speech and the Supreme Court
has been forced to intercede to address the constitutionality of such
regulations.
In response to the Espionage Act and state sedition laws, the
Supreme Court developed a standard for interpreting the scope of
First Amendment protections of speech. One of the best-known
tests for defining the scope of constitutionally protected speech by
the First Amendment is the “clear and present danger” test
illustrated by Justice Holmes in 1919 in Schenck v. United States.38
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, noted that even “the most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”39 The Court
in Schenck explained that Schenck’s leaflets advocating draft
dodging presented a clear and present danger that Congress had a
right to prevent, as it is not constitutionally protected speech. 40
Over time, the clear and present danger test was abandoned and a

34

Id.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); see also 6 JAMES
MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 336 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
36
See 2 O’BRIEN, supra note 30, at 412.
37
See id. at 336, 412.
38
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
39
Id. at 52.
40
Id. at 53.
35
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balancing approach was adopted that weighed First Amendment
freedoms against government interests.41
After the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, decisions of
the Supreme Court established that the First Amendment applied
equally to the states; accordingly, the Court was tasked with
defining the scope of constitutionally protected speech.42 It wasn’t
until 1936 that the Supreme Court held that constitutional
principles—as opposed to English common law—governed the
scope of protected speech. 43 Justice Sutherland unambiguously
stated, “[i]t is impossible to concede that by the words ‘freedom of
the press’ the framers of the amendment intended to adopt merely
the narrow view then reflected by the law of England.”44 As a
result, the Court was faced with numerous First Amendment
challenges to state laws that attempted to restrict free speech.
To determine whether a state may constitutionally proscribe
speech, the Court must first ask whether the law attempts to
regulate speech or conduct. 45 The Court also distinguishes
between content-based regulations, which seek to restrict speech
based on its content, and content-neutral regulations, which can be
justified without reference to the content of the speech.46 Contentneutral regulations such as time, place, and manner restrictions,
although not unlimited, are subject to intermediate scrutiny
requiring the state to show that the law is substantially related to an
important governmental interest. 47 Content-based restrictions,
however, are presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict
scrutiny.48
41

See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 530 (1951).
42
See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (holding First Amendment
freedoms to be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and “so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of the people as to be ranked as fundamental”). See generally Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
43
See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936).
44
Id. at 248.
45
See Qasir, supra note 20, at 3656.
46
See CHEMERINSKY supra note 5, at 960–62.
47
See Qasir, supra note 20, at 3657.
48
Id. at 3656–57.
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Although free speech is a fundamental right, the Court does not
protect all speech equally. The Supreme Court has established a
hierarchy of speech protections with certain categories of speech
considered to be disfavored and not presumptively protected by the
First Amendment. 49 The Court has created exceptions for state
laws that regulate or limit disfavored speech. 50 Two such
categories of disfavored speech include speech inciting violence
and fighting words.51 The Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio struck
down a law that convicted a Ku Klux Klan group leader of
advocating violence.52 In Brandenburg, the Court explained that
while the government has a compelling interest in preventing
people from inciting violence, advocacy of violence is not
problematic unless it is directly intended to produce imminent
lawless action and is likely to induce such action. 53 With state
regulations that proscribe speech that is likely to incite violence,
the Supreme Court has included an imminency requirement:
simple advocacy of force does not remove speech from the
protection of the First Amendment.54
Fighting words, on the other hand, are thought to incite
violence directed against the speaker rather than violence
undertaken to further the speaker’s cause. Typically, the claim is
that provocative speech so enrages the audience that some listeners
are likely to use violence against the speaker. In Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, Justice Murphy unambiguously laid out the
hierarchy of speech categories, noting that fighting words are less
worthy of protection:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which has never been thought to raise any
constitutional problem. These include the lewd and
49

See CHEMERINSKY supra note 5, at 1017–19.
Id.
51
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
52
See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444–45.
53
See id. at 447.
54
See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927–28 (1982).
50
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obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or ‘fighting words’ – those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality.55
Again, the Court indicated that the First Amendment does not
presumptively protect all speech. In Cohen v. California, the
Court distinguished fighting words from obscenity and included a
“likelihood of violence” requirement for state regulation. 56 In
Cohen, the Court struck down Cohen’s conviction, indicating that
because there was no evidence showing that Cohen’s message,
“Fuck the Draft,” was either intended to arouse or actually aroused
a violent reaction, the message did not constitute fighting words.57
Ultimately, speech that incites violence and fighting words are
disfavored, but not entirely removed, from First Amendment
protection.
However, the Court affords significantly more
deference to the states to regulate or proscribe such speech so long
as the imminency and likelihood of violence requirements are met.
C. Cyberbullying: The Detrimental Effects of Unrestricted
Cyberspeech on the Nation’s Youth
Cyberbullying—the harassment of classmates, friends,
enemies, or even strangers, on the Internet—has become
increasingly prevalent in today’s society, especially among
children and teenagers. Unfortunately, the Internet has provided a
new medium for individuals to anonymously, pseudonymously, or
identifiably harass, embarrass, and threaten others. The public
nature of the Internet, specifically social media, makes the
harassment especially harmful for children and teenagers who are
at an impressionable age. Furthermore, the immediacy of instant
55
56
57

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (emphasis added).
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Id. at 20.
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messaging, emailing, text messaging, and other messaging
applications on cellphones has put this age group at a further
disadvantage.
There are numerous media through which individuals can use
cyberspeech to spread hate and harass others without the victim’s
participation. Text messaging and the messenger application Kik,
released in October of 2010 for smartphones, allow individuals to
transmit messages and images to people’s phones, regardless of
whether or not those people wish to receive them. Kik allows
individuals to identify themselves by a personalized username that
may or may not have anything to do with their actual name or
phone number.58 Applications such as Kik can be used to cloak
the user in secrecy or create an entirely different persona, giving
individuals yet another opportunity to harass their peers.
The Honorable Brian P. Stern, Associate Justice, Rhode Island
Superior Court, succinctly described cyberbullying and explained
the harm it can, and does, cause:
With the click of a mouse button and a few
keystrokes, tormentors can reach their targets any
time of day or night from anywhere in the world.
Tormentors are instantly able to spread lies and
embarrassing information about their victims to
hundreds and thousands of people at a time. This
24/7 widespread harassment can have a far more
dangerous effect on the victim than traditional
bullying.59
Cyberbullying, much like traditional bullying, can cause
psychological harm such as depression, anxiety, isolation, and low
self-esteem. 60 Furthermore, the repercussions of cyberbullying
often last longer as the harassing, embarrassing, or threatening

58

See ABOUT KIK MESSENGER, http://kik.com/about (last visited Feb. 13, 2014).
Hon. Brian P. Stern & Thomas Evans, Cyberbullying—An Age Old Problem, A New
Generation, 59 R.I. BAR J. 21, 21 (2011).
60
See Alison Virginia King, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the
Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 851
(2010) (examining several cyberbulling instances and their negative repercussions).
59
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comments remain in cyberspace indefinitely, able to be shared and
re-shared with the simple click of a mouse.61
Tragically, cyberbullying has been involved in recent suicides
among teenagers and students. In Missouri, a 47-year-old woman
named Lori Drew pushed thirteen-year-old Megan Meier to suicide
through cyberbullying.62 Drew, knowing that Megan was taking
anti-depressants, concocted a fake MySpace account under the
name Josh Evans and pretended to be a sixteen-year-old boy. 63
Under this pseudonym, Drew flirted with Megan for weeks but
then began to harass and insult Megan, ultimately writing “[t]he
world would be a better place without you.” 64 After this final
insult and the barrage of insults from “Josh” and others, Megan
went to her room and hanged herself. 65 Though she arguably
directly caused Megan’s suicide, Drew was never charged with a
crime.
Another highly publicized suicide attributed to cyberbullying is
that of eighteen-year-old Rutgers University freshman Tyler
Clementi in 2010. On September 19, 2010, Clementi’s roommate,
Dharun Ravi, also eighteen years old, tweeted that he saw
Clementi “[m]aking out with a dude” and used his webcam to live
stream Clementi’s intimate relations with another man in
Clementi’s own dorm room. 66 Only three days later, Tyler
Clementi posted a chilling message on his Facebook page,
“[j]umping off the gw bridge sorry” and proceeded to commit
suicide by jumping into the Hudson River.67 Ravi faced numerous
charges including invasion of privacy and bias intimidation. 68
61

See id. at 850–51.
See Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned Fatal Draws Anger but No Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/us/28hoax.html.
63
See id.
64
Id.
65
See id.
66
Lisa W. Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal Jump, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/nyregion/30suicide.html?page
wanted=all.
67
Id.
68
See Richard Pérez-Peña, Rutgers Dorm Spying Trial Begins with Questions of
Motivation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/nyregion/intyler-clementi-trial-looking-at-dharun-ravis-intentions.html.
62
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Ultimately, Ravi was convicted on all counts, including the felony
charges, and served thirty days in jail, avoiding deportation back to
India.69
More recently, a twelve-year-old girl in Florida has become
one of the youngest victims driven to suicide by cyberbullying.70
Rebecca was apparently cyberbullied by fifteen other middle
school children for over a year and bombarded with insults and
urges to kill herself through messaging apps such as Kik
Messenger.71 Ultimately, two girls were charged with felonies for
cyberbullying, but the charges were dropped because, although
their messages were of the type that some children could find
emotionally crushing, “the posts did not rise to the level of a
crime.” 72 As technology advances, children and teenagers are
constantly finding new ways to harass, embarrass, and threaten
their peers. As a result, more and more of the nation’s youth are
being driven to suicide due to cyberbullying.73
II. CYBERBULLYING AND SPEECH REGULATIONS IN CYBERSPACE:
ANONYMOUS AND AUTHORED SPEECH AND HOW IT MAY BE
REGULATED
On the Internet, anonymous users can make use of a plethora of
media to disseminate their opinions. The Internet allows the
communication of text, sound, images, and pictures between
devices and can be accessed at any time by any person with a
69

See Kate Zernike, Rutgers Webcam-Spying Defendant Sentenced to 30 Days, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/nyregion/rutgers-spyingdefendant-sentenced-to-30-days-in-jail.html.
70
Lizette Alvarez, Girl’s Suicide Points to Rise in Apps Used by Cyberbullies, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/us/suicide-of-girl-afterbullying-raises-worries-on-web-sites.html?_r=0.
71
See id.
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Lizette Alvarez, Charges Dropped in Cyber-bullying Death, but Sheriff Isn’t
Backing down, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/
22/us/charges-dropped-against-florida-girls-accused-in-cyber-bullyingdeath.html?_r=1&.
73
See Kathleen Conn, Allegations of School District Liability for Bullying,
Cyberbullying, and Teen Suicides After Sexting: Are New Legal Standards Emerging in
the Courts?, 37 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 227, 223–24 (2011).
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computer or other Internet-ready device. 74 Since cyberspace is
accessible without respect to geographic boundaries, “there is no
current method to limit its accessibility to within state boundaries
or selectively limit its dissemination to any geographic area.”75 As
such, the law as it stands is insufficient to address harmful
information disseminated on the internet. Cyberspace has become
a hotbed for destructive speech, cyberbullying, and “sexting,” as
well as defamation, tortious interference with business, and
copyright infringement.76 As a result, many states are imposing
criminal penalties for the sharing of sexually explicit materials
involving children. For example, New York has enacted the Cyber
Crimes Youth Rescue Act, mandating an eight-hour educational
program for youths accused of sharing sexually explicit images of
other minors.77
Many early cyberspeech regulations focused on minors, but
were not entirely efficient. In response to the perceived danger
that “predatory adults will expose minors” to harmful matter on the
Internet, Congress and several states – California, New York, New
Mexico, Michigan, and Virginia – have enacted penal statutes
criminalizing the “dissemination of harmful matter to minors over
the Internet.”78 The Court has consistently justified protection of
minors as a compelling state interest warranting regulation of
certain types of speech.79 With respect to the Internet, however,
the Court has found these types of regulations to be overbroad.80
Enacted by Congress, section 223 of the Communications Decency
Act of 1996 (CDA) sought to prohibit any sexually explicit

74

See Alex C. McDonald, Dissemination of Harmful Matter to Minors over the
Internet, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 163, 166–67 (2001).
75
Id. at 168.
76
See Qasir, supra note 20.
77
Cybercrime Youth Rescue Act, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws A. 8170-B (McKinney).
78
See McDonald, supra note 74, at 163–64.
79
See generally Alan E. Garfield, Protecting Children from Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV.
565 (2005) (examining the First Amendment concerns inherent in the concept of
sheltering children from otherwise free speech).
80
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004); Reno v. Am.
Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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communications from use in telecommunications. 81 The law
specifically sought, in § 223(a), to criminalize the “knowing
transmission of obscene or indecent messages” to minors,82 and in
§ 223(d) to criminalize sending or displaying a message to a minor
“that, in any context, depicts or describes [in offensive terms . . . ]
sexual or excretory activities or organs.”83 This law, however, was
entirely focused on the availability of offensive material to minors,
not all Internet users.
Shortly after its enactment, the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) challenged the constitutionality of § 223(a)(1) and §
223(d) in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union.84 Writing for
the majority, Justice Stevens recognized the “importance of the
congressional goal of protecting children from harmful materials,”
but ultimately found that the statute abridged First Amendment
protections of freedom of speech.85 Justice Stevens noted that the
CDA applied broadly to all aspects of cyberspace and was
therefore a content-based regulation of speech that must be
evaluated under strict scrutiny.86 Although the statute was found
to be impermissibly broad, in dicta, Justice Stevens discussed an
attribute of cyberspace that has significantly changed in today’s
society as opposed to that of 1997.87 He noted that the Internet is
“not as ‘invasive’ as radio or television,” and agreed with the
district court that “[c]ommunications over the Internet do not
‘invade’ an individual’s home or appear on one’s computer screen
unbidden.”88 In making this determination, Justice Stevens likened
cyberspace to the press, a less invasive medium for expression.
However, the Internet has changed drastically since 1997 and has
become significantly more immediate and intertwined in daily life.
81

Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, invalidated in
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Pa. 1996)).
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Additionally, children and minors make up a significant portion of
Internet users.
Another example of regulation of cyberspeech directed at
minors, since held by the Court to be unconstitutional,89 was the
Child Online Protection Act (COPA), which criminalized
transmission over the Internet, for commercial purposes, of
material “harmful to minors.” 90 In Ashcroft v. American Civil
Liberties Union, the Court enjoined the enforcement of the Child
Online Protection Act of 1998 for burdening adult access to
protected speech. 91 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
upheld the district court’s injunction and remanded the case for
further examination on the issue of whether there were less
restrictive alternatives to COPA.92 Justice Kennedy reiterated that
content-based prohibitions have the “constant potential to be a
repressive force in the lives and thoughts of a free people,” and are
thus presumptively invalid.93 Although COPA was struck down,
the Court did note that other forms of restricting speech on the
Internet, such as prohibitions on misleading domain names, are
valid. 94 Still, the laws regarding prohibitions of misleading
information are not adequate to address cyberbullying or other
dissemination of harmful information on the Internet.
Aside from protection of minors, personal privacy is another
issue Congress and states look to in justifying regulations.
Although the Court has recognized a right to privacy implicit in the
penumbras of the Constitution, 95 privacy torts are “of limited
utility when applied to the Internet.”96 One example of the failure
of tort law in cyberspace is the case of Boring v. Google, Inc.,
where the Borings sued Google for taking images of their home on
89

See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008); see also
Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
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Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-736 (1998).
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542 U.S. 656 (2004).
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Id. at 660.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 663 (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 2252B).
95
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
96
See Terence J. Lau, Towards Zero Net Presence, 25 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 237, 264 (2011).
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a private road for dissemination on Google’s “Street View”
mapping program.97 There, the district court dismissed the suit for
invasion of privacy because of a failure to establish Google’s
conduct as “highly offensive to a person of ordinary
sensibilities.”98
There have also been attempts to protect online privacy
through the use of criminal laws. Various states have enacted
criminal laws to address cyberstalking, cyberharassment, and
cyberbullying. 99 However, there is currently no federal law
addressing cyberharassment or cyberbullying. 100 Congress has
taken some steps to regulate the Internet, such as enacting the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), which criminalizes
computer fraud.101 However, in United States v. Drew, a case in
which a mother created a fake MySpace profile of a teenage boy to
harass and bully a teenage girl, the district court held the law to be
unconstitutionally vague.102
Some commentators believe that even the states that do attempt
to regulate and protect online privacy are unsuccessful in their
efforts. Terence J. Lau, Associate Professor, University of Dayton,
describes state regulation of online privacy as “meager and
pitiful.”103 Blogs, for instance, are an area of concern for online
privacy regulation. Although multifaceted, blogs are popularly
used by children and teenagers, and can become virtual diaries that
are shared throughout cyberspace.104 Currently, speech of private
concern on the Internet is given less protection than speech of
public concern, somewhat limiting bloggers’ rights to engage in
97
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2009)).
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online gossip.105 Overall, however, there is little state regulation in
this area today.
The state regulation that exists in this area is, at this point,
insufficient. Much of it focuses solely on the protection of minors
or privacy. Furthermore, federal regulations, such as the CDA,
COPA, and CFAA, do not sufficiently fill the gaps left by state
laws.
As there are currently no federal laws addressing
cyberharassment or cyberbullying, the Internet remains a
potentially dangerous place in need of regulations.106 The law as it
stands, in its current state, is inadequate to address cyberbullying
and must be amended. Ultimately, both federal and state
regulations of cyberspeech fall short of addressing free speech
concerns while still serving governmental interests.
III. CREATING A PROPER STANDARD TO EVALUATE CYBERSPEECH
REGULATIONS: RESURRECTING THE TRADITIONAL HIERARCHY OF
PROTECTED SPEECH
First Amendment law with respect to free speech should be
used to govern cyberbullying. Applying the traditional hierarchy
of protected speech to cyberspeech would remedy the current
inadequacies in the current laws regulating cyberspeech. In the
United States, freedom of speech is a fundamental right but it is
not absolute, and certain types of speech are subject to
governmental regulation. Cyberbullying on the Internet must be
regulated, but currently there are no uniform standards for federal
or state regulation of such harmful speech. The First Amendment
guarantees both the freedom of speech and of the press, and
protections of expressions made in cyberspace are more analogous
to the protections afforded speech than those bestowed upon the
press. As such, traditional standards of scrutiny should govern the
Court’s analysis of state regulations. Part III.A discusses some of
the challenges inherent in regulating anonymous cyberspeech and
reasons that cyberspeech unequivocally falls under First
105

Daniel J. Solove, A Tale of Two Bloggers: Free Speech & Privacy in the
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Amendment protections and regulations. Part III.B argues that the
immense reach of the Internet, permeating everyday life, renders
cyberspeech more akin to freedom of speech rather than to
freedom of the press and, accordingly, places cyberbullying in the
disfavored speech category of speech that incites violence or
fighting words. Finally, Part III.C applies the traditional hierarchy
of protected speech to cyberspeech presenting guidelines for how
courts and legislatures should approach cyberbullying. Ultimately,
both state and federal governments should regulate cyberspeech in
the same manner and to the same extent as they may regulate the
spoken word.
A. Some of the Challenges Inherent in Regulating Anonymous
Cyberspeech
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects
speech in cyberspace but that such protection is not absolute.107
Congress and the states have attempted to regulate cyberspeech in
one way or another, though such attempts are inevitably restricted
by the scope of the First Amendment. As a result of years of
accumulating Supreme Court jurisprudence, states are afforded
“wide latitude in regulating classes of speech that offer such
negligible social value” as to be outweighed by social interests in
order and social morality.108 Although cyberbullying clearly offers
little to no social value, legislators are tasked with crafting
cyberspeech laws that do not infringe upon protected speech
rights.109
It is clear that anonymous speech is protected by the
Constitution and has been since the Founding Era. 110 In the
Founding Era, anonymous speech was protected in order to
encourage political speech such as that found in the Federalist
Papers and Anti-Federalist Papers.111 These types of anonymous
speech were protected because of the value of encouraging
107
108
109
110
111

See Qasir, supra note 20, at 3653.
See King, supra note 60, at 865.
Id. at 865–66.
See Qasir, supra note 20, at 3652.
See supra note 2.
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political discourse. The Founders did not seek to protect
anonymous speech so as to encourage harassment, which is what
unrestricted cyberspeech fosters today. Furthermore, from an
originalist perspective, “most of modern First Amendment doctrine
is incompatible with the original understanding of the freedom of
the press.” 112 The policies and principles for protecting
anonymous speech and the press in the Founding Era are no longer
as relevant in the Internet era. Cyberspeech that fosters intelligent
or political discourse should naturally be protected regardless of
whether or not it is anonymous. However, even originalist
principles cannot justify protecting anonymous cyberspeech that
fosters hate and cyberbullying.
There are also privacy concerns regarding regulation of
anonymous cyberspeech.
The Supreme Court has already
restrained the right to anonymous speech by imposing disclosure
requirements in campaign finance laws. 113 However, these
mandatory disclosure laws would have a different effect on
cyberspeech. First, privacy concerns may outweigh a mandatory
disclosure as individuals have the right to voluntarily disclose what
aspects, if any, of their identity that they wish to express. 114
Imposing a mandatory disclosure requirement could destroy all
anonymity on the Internet and, if taken to the extreme, could
destroy the voluntariness of cyberspace. Furthermore, courts have
found that the justifications115 for restriction of anonymous speech
in printed media, such as corruption in campaign finance, “do not
apply to online speech, and the government should protect
speakers’ legitimate expectations of privacy.” 116 However, it is
unclear exactly how much privacy the Supreme Court aimed to
protect when protecting anonymous speech: it is possible that the
Supreme Court was “protecting political privacy rather than

112
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creating a broad right to anonymity.”117 Placing broad restrictions
on anonymous cyberspeech that would require identity disclosure
has the potential to change the entire character of the Internet and
eliminate any expectation of privacy that individuals are entitled to
under the Constitution.
The current regulations regarding cyberbullying are met with
various challenges. Much of the legislation attempting to regulate
cyberbullying is found in a state’s education statutes rather than in
penal codes. 118 Most laws prohibit cyberbullying in the publicschool context, which gives more responsibility to teachers and
administrators to combat online harassment.119 Furthermore, the
current regulations are often perceived as inadequate as the laws
“are not always written to deal with the nuances of
cyberbullying.”120 Specifically, victims of cyberbulling more often
than not have no legal remedy they can turn to for recourse.121
Although victims can often rely on harassment or cyberstalking
laws, these have proven to be inadequate solutions to the problem
of cyberbullying. 122 Ultimately, the current regulations attempt to
avoid important First Amendment questions but as a result are
insufficient to serve their intended aim of combating
cyberbullying.
The Supreme Court has ruled that the First Amendment
In examining the
protects speech in cyberspace. 123
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Justice Stevens established
that certain types of speech-based regulations in cyberspace could
be potentially overbroad. 124 Although Justice Stevens likened
cyberspace to the less-invasive press medium, the Internet has
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evolved significantly since then.125 Accordingly, First Amendment
protections are becoming more prevalent in the courts and
regulations are being passed more frequently. 126 Ultimately,
cyberspeech is speech and, therefore, is subject to the protections
and limitations established by the First Amendment.
The
remaining questions concern the extent to which that speech may
be regulated by government without infringing upon those First
Amendment protections.
B. The Vast Reach & Impact of Cyberspeech: Analogous to
Traditional Speech Categories
The Internet is omnipresent in today’s society, permeating even
the most intimate aspects of individuals’ lives. There is no longer
a waiting period for news or writing to reach the desired recipient
or audience; rather, a message can now be delivered within
seconds of its creation. Especially with the increasing popularity
of social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter,
communication has become easier and more pervasive. All that is
required to view, receive, or create any form of cyberspeech is WiFi access or any form of Internet connection.
As such,
cyberspeech is more similar to speech than to the press and should
be regulated according to the rules of freedom of speech rather
than the principles of freedom of the press.127
Furthermore, cyberbullying is analogous to both speech that
incites violence and to fighting words.128 These speech categories
are traditionally considered to be of low value, and thus disfavored
by the First Amendment, and do not receive presumptive
protection. 129 The same type of speech printed on the Internet
should thus be regulated according to the same standards and those
125
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regulations reviewed under the same level of scrutiny. Hate
speech, threats, and other insults that incite violence and that are
published on the Internet, do not deserve presumptive protection
and should be regulated by Congress and the states.
The instantaneous nature of the Internet is what likens
cyberbullying to speech that incites violence and fighting words.
The main concern with speech that incites violence and fighting
words is in the likelihood of imminent lawless action. 130 With
social media and the Internet pervading virtually all aspects of life,
it is increasingly likely that hateful speech, such as that involved in
cyberbullying, will result in immediate violent action. As noted
above, cyberbullying has already led to an increased number of
suicides among teenagers, which is unambiguously a negative
consequence of cyberspeech.131
Additionally, not all cyberspeech is posted in cyberspace to
passively await an audience. Rather, much cyberspeech is instead
directed at individuals and reaches them more immediately.
Texting and messaging apps like Kik assume an active role,
bombarding the message recipient with notifications that a
message has been received. 132 Sometimes a recipient need not
open the application to read the message they have received.
Imminent lawless action or violence against the speaker is not only
possible in such situations, but at times may even be probable. In
today’s society, where the Internet’s reach is so vast and its use so
prevalent, cyberspeech, especially cyberbullying, is clearly
analogous to speech that incites violence and fighting words. As
such, the traditional hierarchy of favored versus disfavored speech
should be applied to cyberspeech, and cyberbullying should be
regulated accordingly as this form of speech falls into the
disfavored category of speech that incites violence and fighting
words.
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C. Applying the Traditional Hierarchy to Cyberspeech
First Amendment scholar Eugene Volokh expertly argues that
controversies about cyberspeech should “be driven not by the
medium, but by the relatively medium-independent underlying free
speech principles.” 133 The current methods of regulating
cyberspeech are inadequate insofar as they are largely dependent
on other laws, including education reform and criminal harassment
laws. 134 Because the Internet is a medium for speech, both
authored and anonymous, that speech should be regulated under
traditional speech standards. However, these laws are often
overbroad and do not actually provide a sufficient remedy for
victims of cyberbullying. Harassment law, for example, “operates
to generally suppress speech.” 135 Additionally, the laws for
cyberharassment are not necessarily unique to cyberspace and have
little to do with the actual medium of cyberspace.136
Evaluating content-based restrictions on cyberspeech reveals
that the online medium is largely irrelevant to the actual restriction
on speech.137 Because the Internet is instantaneous, it is highly
probable that certain speech would incite imminent lawless action.
The imminence requirement is easily met given that messages
posted in cyberspace are instantly transmitted throughout
cyberspace to thousands of users.
The same is true for
cyberspeech that may incite violence against the speaker. Fighting
words on the Internet are more pervasive than those simply
displayed in public, for example on a jacket.138 The messages that
teenagers spread throughout cyberspace frequently lead to violence
and tragically to an increasing number of suicides.139
In arguing for the passage of the Online Freedom of Speech
Act, Senator Bill Frist noted that “the Internet represents the most
133
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participatory form of mass speech in human history.” 140 The
purpose of the Online Freedom of Speech Act was to protect the
privacy of bloggers and ensure that the expression of political
views on the Internet was not infringed upon.141 While this is a
legitimate concern, the law itself does not address the need for a
proper and uniform standard for regulating cyberspeech. The
Internet is exceptionally participatory and is a highly effective
medium for the spread of political opinions and intelligent
discourse. However, cyberspace is also a medium for hateful
speech that is highly detrimental to the nation’s youth. Congress
and the states have a duty to protect the nation’s youth, and
cyberspeech accordingly should be regulated based on its content.
The proper standard for regulating cyberspeech is to simply
resurrect the traditional hierarchy of protected speech and apply it
in the context of cyberspace.142
Applying this traditional hierarchy to cyberspeech, it is easy to
determine into which categories different types of cyberspeech
will fall. For example, a product description on the Amazon
website would be commercial speech and a product review on the
same website would likely fall into the same category. Messages
posted on a comment board about politics, tweets about current
events, and messages posted on a candidate’s webpage would
likely fall into the category of political discourse and would thus
be protected. Cyberbullying, however, clearly falls into the
categories of speech that incite violence and fighting words.
Ultimately, applying the traditional First Amendment hierarchy to
online speech results in cyberbullying falling under the categories
of speech that incite violence and fighting words. As these are
historically disfavored categories of speech that do not enjoy
presumptive protection, cyberbullying thus falls under the purview
of Congress and the states to regulate.

140
141
142

152 CONG. REC. S1954-02 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2006) (statement of Sen. Frist).
Id.
See discussion supra Part I.B.

850

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 24:823

CONCLUSION
The First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech,
anonymous and authored, written and spoken, in the tangible
sphere and in cyberspace.143 Speech protection is neither absolute
nor equal for all types of speech. There is a hierarchy in which
certain categories, such as fighting words, are disfavored and
largely unprotected from governmental regulation, and other
categories, such as political discourse, are granted presumptive
protection. 144 Anonymous speech occurs in both of these
categories. Specifically in cyberspace, anonymous speech is used
to instantly spread hateful and harmful speech. This has led to an
increase in teenage suicides resulting from cyberbullying. Current
federal and state attempts to regulate speech are inadequate and
often under-inclusive or overbroad, resulting in significant First
Amendment challenges.
Speech, both anonymous and authored, that is published on the
Internet is more analogous to the spoken word than to publications
in the press and should therefore be governed by speech freedom
rather than press freedom. The cyberspace medium itself should
not dictate the means through which speech is regulated. Instead,
the traditional hierarchy of speech protections should be applied to
cyberspeech. Cyberbullying, with its immediacy and intimate
involvement in everyday life, should be regulated in the same way
as speech that incites violence or fighting words. Therefore,
cyberbullying should be considered a disfavored category of
speech, one that has low social value, which may thus be regulated
by Congress and the states. The Court should recognize that
cyberspeech is on the same level as spoken speech, and that
governmental regulations attempting to proscribe the type of
speech found in cyberbullying should be reviewed under strict
scrutiny, with the highest deference afforded to the government.
Moving forward, states must be able to regulate anonymous
cyberspeech in the same manner and to the same extent that they
may regulate the spoken word.
143
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